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A. Reimbursement of Community Contributions to
a Spouse's Education upon Divorce: California
Civil Code Section 4800.3
When the California Legislature passed California Civil Code section
4800.3, it attempted to create a remedy for the circumstances posed by the
highly publicized case of In re Marriage of Sullivan. The legislature created a
new cause of action for "reimbursement" of funds contributed to the educa-
tion or training of a spouse. The question remains whether reimbursement is
an equitable and workable remedy for the Sullivan type situation. This com-
ment analyzes the section and suggests possible approaches to litigation of a
section 4800.3 claim.
I. INTRODUCTION
The case of In re Marriage of Sullivan' presented an issue of great
concern to many people, those within the legal community and the
public at large. To the public at large this highly publicized 2 case in-
1. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354
(1984), 134 Cal. App. 3d 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1982), vacated,
2. See Allen, Court Recognizes Marital 'Interest' in Medical License, L.A. Daily
J., January 13, 1982 at 1, col. 3; Arnold, Divorcee Entitled to Share Doctor's Future
Earnings, L.A. Times, January 12, 1982 at 1, col. 6, 7; Sullivan, Divorce American
Style, Is Killing Me By Degrees, L.A. Times, January 19, 1982, Part II, at 5, col. 1, 2;
Doctor Ordered to Share Value of MD. Degree with Ex-wife, L.A. Daily J., December
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volved concepts close to the hearts of many present and future
"young professionals." To some, the prospect that a medical degree
might be community property constituted a financial threat; to others
it constituted the only means of compensation for years of support
throughout the marriage. To the legal community the question of
whether a medical degree should be community property raised a
conflict between traditional property concepts and basic equitable
considerations. Although the issue has been ruled upon many times
before in many courts throughout the country,3 it remains an area in
which judicial remedies vary widely.4 The California legislature at-
tempted to remedy the situation presented by the Sullivan case by
amending California Civil Code sections 4800 and 4801, and adding
section 4800.3.
Section 4800.3 provides reimbursement to the community, uphold-
ing prior case law that a professional degree is not property.5 Having
taken effect on January 1, 1985, it applies retroactively to unfinalized
property settlements in pending divorce proceedings.6 Although the
California Supreme Court remanded the Sullivan case to be decided
in accord with section 4800.3, the law has yet to be tested or applied.7
This comment will focus on three major areas: (1) an analysis of the
section and how it might be construed; (2) whether the law will pro-
vide a workable remedy for the supporting spouse in a "career
threshold, no asset divorce;"8 and (3) how a litigant should approach
a claim under section 4800.3.
II. CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 4800.3
A. The Structure of the Section
Subsection (a) of section 4800.3 defines "community contributions
11, 1980, at 2, col. 4. Much commentary on this issue has been published. For a com-
prehensive listing, see Mullenix, The Valuation of an Educational Degree at Divorce,
16 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 227, 229 n.7 (1983).
3. For a comprehensive listing of the cases deciding the issue of whether a profes-
sional degree is community property, see Mullenix, supra note 2, at 228 nn.6-7.
4. For a summary of the various remedies granted by the courts, see In re Mar.
riage of Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 677 P.2d 152 (1984).
5. California courts have held that a professional degree is not property. See In
re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979); Todd v. Todd,
272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969).
6. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.3 (West Supp. 1985). The section has limited retroactiv-
ity. Constitutional arguments have been raised against limited retroactivity under
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4800.1 and 4800.2 (West Supp. 1985) and are conceivable here. How-
ever, the supreme court has impliedly sanctioned the section's retroactivity in the Sul-
livan decision. See supra note 1.
7. 37 Cal. 3d at 762, 691 P.2d at 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
8. The phrase "career threshold, no asset divorce" is taken from Comment, For
Richer or Poorer-Equities In The Career-Threshold, No-Asset Divorce, 58 TUL. L. REv.
791 (1984).
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to education or training."9 The body of the statute, subsections (b)
and (c), provide the basis for claims. Subsection (b), clauses (1) and
(2) state the circumstances which "trigger" reimbursement. If sub-
section (b) is satisfied, then subsection (c), clauses (1), (2) and (3) act
to provide circumstances in which reimbursement "shall be reduced
or modified."o Therefore, the section has essentially two parts: sub-
section (b) provides reimbursement and subsection (c) limits it.
The legislature defined the scope of the section under subsections
9. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800.3 provides in full:
Community contributions to education or training
(a) As used in this section, "community contributions to education or train-
ing" means payments made with community property for education or train-
ing or for the repayment of a loan incurred for education or training.
(b) Subject to the limitations provided in this section, upon dissolution of
marriage or legal separation:
(1) The community shall be reimbursed for community contributions to
education or training of a party that substantially enhances the earning ca-
pacity of the party. The amount reimbursed shall be with interest at the
legal rate, accruing from the end of the calendar year in which the contribu-
tions were made.
(2) A loan incurred during marriage for the education or training of a
party shall not be included among the liabilities of the community for the
purpose of division pursuant to Section 4800 but shall be assigned for pay-
ment by the party.
(c) The reimbursement and assignment required by this section shall be re-
duced or modified to the extent circumstances render such a disposition un-
just, including but not limited to any of the following:
(1) The community has substantially benefited from the education, train-
ing, or loan incurred for the education or training of the party. There is a
rebuttable presumption, affecting the burden of proof, that the community
has not substantially benefited from community contributions to the educa-
tion or training made less than 10 years before the commencement of the
proceeding, and that the community has substantially benefited from com-
munity contributions to the education or training made more than 10 years
before the commencement of the proceeding.
(2) The education or training received by the party is offset by the educa-
tion or training received by the other party for which community contribu-
tions have been made.
(3) The education or training enables the party receiving the education or
training to engage in gainful employment that substantially reduces the
need of the party for support that would otherwise be required.
(d) Reimbursement for community contributions and assignment of loans
pursuant to this section is the exclusive remedy of the community or a party
for the education or training and any resulting enhancement of the earning
capacity of a party. However, nothing in this subdivision shall limit considera-
tion of the effect of the education, training, or enhancement, or the amount
reimbursed pursuant to this section, on the circumstances of the parties for
the purpose of an order for support pursuant to Section 4801.
(3) This section is subject to an express written agreement of the parties to
the contrary.
CAL. CiV. CODE § 4800.3 (West Supp. 1985).
10. Id
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(d) and (e). Subsection (d) states that the section is "the exclusive
remedy of the community or a party for the education or training
and any resulting enhancement of the earning capacity of a
party."" Subsection (e) states that the statute is subject to express
written agreement. Although the structure is uncomplicated, the
language of the statute is broad, ambiguous, and leaves much room
for judicial construction.
B. Construction of the Section
To date, the only case to construe section 4800.3 is In re Marriage
of Sullivan.12 The dissent succinctly analyzes the majority's con-
struction of the section.13 First, the decision refers to "compensa-
tion" rather than "reimbursement."14 Secondly, the court seems to be
taking the point of view of the supporting spouse, whereas section
4800.3 focuses on reimbursement to the community, not an individ-
ual spouse.15
The Sullivan decision adds further ambiguity to an analysis of the
future application of the section. A central issue to any claim under
the section, and the main issue raised by the dissent's focus on the
distinction between compensation and reimbursement, is how the
courts will define "community contributions."
The distinction between compensation and reimbursement is
highly significant to the supporting spouse's claim. Compensation is
a much broader remedial base than strict reimbursement of funds
previously expended.16 It seems probable that in this area the sup-
porting spouse, wielding Sullivan as authority, will seek compensa-
tion, whereas the spouse holding the degree will attempt to restrict
the claim solely to reimbursement.17
C. Analysis of the Section
Reimbursement is a new remedy created by the section. While sec-
tion 4800.3 is entitled "Community contributions to education or
11. Id (emphasis added).
12. 37 Cal. 3d at 762, 691 P.2d at 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 354 (Bird, C.J., for the
majority).
13. 37 Cal. 3d at 770-71, 691 P.2d at 1025-26, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 359-60 (Mosk, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
14. Id. at 770, 691 P.2d at 1025, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
15. Id.
16. "Compensation on the other hand, may be payment in any sum for any lawful
purpose; the Legislature also obviously did not intend to give such a blank check to
trial courts." 37 Cal. 3d at 770, 691 P.2d at 1025, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 359 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
17. See infra note 55. The supporting spouse should allege a claim for compensa-
tion, and alternatively, for reimbursement.
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training,"' 8 it is stated later in the text that reimbursement shall be
provided to the community. The section does not follow any clear ju-
dicial or legislative trend. It bears no similarity to the one other ju-
risdiction whose legislature has enacted a statute expressly in
response to this problem.19 The section creates an area of first im-
pression in California which cannot accurately be analogized to any
existing substantive family law remedies.2 0
Subsection (a) is the definitional clause of the section. "Commu-
nity contributions to education or training" are defined as "payments
made with community property for education or training or for the
repayment of a loan incurred for education or training."21 This will
be the major area of litigation. As the Law Revision Commission
Comment states, "Subdivision (a) does not detail the expenditures
that might be included within the concept of 'community contribu-
tions.' These expenditures would at least include cost[s] of tuition,
fees, books and supplies, and transportation."2 2 The section does not
allow for reimbursement of contributions made from quasi-commu-
nity property.2 3
18. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.3 (West Supp. 1985). Training is not defined by the sec-
tion. Therefore, it might be training for any type of work position, not only that in-
volving a professional degree. If training is defined to include, for example, training to
be a plumber or a beautician, the section will have an effect on a large number of mar-
riages.
The section expressly applies only upon dissolution of marriage. Palimony situa-
tions are not covered by the section. If the parties have lived together but have not
married they are not subject to the statute. Palimony partners may, therefore, assert
the claims previously available to married spouses, such as claim that the professional
degree is jointly-acquired property. See supra notes 3-4.
19. Most states do not specifically refer to professional education or licenses in
their community property statutes. One exception is Indiana. See IND. CODE tit. 31,
Ch. 11.5 § 31-1-11.5-11(c) (1980):
(c) When the court finds there is little or no marital property, it may award
either spouse a money judgment not limited to the existing property. How-
ever, this award may be made only for the financial contribution of one [1]
spouse toward tuition, books, and laboratory fees for the higher education of
the other spouse.
Id.
20. Practitioners should note that reimbursement is not the same as a property
right, asset or obligation. A claim can be made in the same manner as a community
property claim, but practitioners should be aware of potentially defective pleadings.
See infra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
21. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800.3(a) (West Supp. 1985).
22. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800.3, Cal. L. Revision Comm'n Comment (West Supp.
1985).
23. Quasi-community property was included in the section as originally proposed
by the Law Revision Commission. See Recommendation Relating to Reimbursement
of Educational Expenses, 17 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 229, 240 (1984).
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Subsection (b), clause (1) is the operational provision of the statute.
If community contributions substantially enhance the earning capac-
ity of the party, then the community shall be reimbursed. The focus
is therefore on the spouse who has gained the degree or training.
The Law Revision Commission Comment adds little to the meaning
of "substantially enhance." It states:
[t]he education or training must demonstrably enhance earning capacity ....
However, it is not required that the party actually work in an occupation to
which the enhancement applies; community contributions were made to the
enhancement for the benefit of one party, who retains the potential to realize
the enhancement in the future.24
Therefore, two undefined areas in which judicial construction
could change the entire effect and purpose of the law arise: how to
define "community contributions" and how to define "substantial en-
hancement."25 Additionally, the amount reimbursed must be reim-
bursed with interest at the legal rate.26
Clause (2) supersedes former section 4800(b)(4) and exempts edu-
cational loans from community liabilities. Therefore the party hold-
ing the degree is assigned the liability. This provision focuses on
personal liability, not community liability, unlike the rest of the sec-
tion. Although consistent with the aim of attempting to provide an
equitable remedy for the supporting spouse, this provision contradicts
the section's focus on "community" funds. If funds are to be reim-
bursed to the community, and not directly to the supporting spouse,
it is inconsistent not to assign other liabilities incurred to the commu-
nity. This inconsistency highlights the lack of a logical basis for the
main function of the section-reimbursement to the community.
The community is clearly an abstract entity. Property acquired
during the marriage is certainly community property.27 However, in
the Sullivan type situation, expenditures clearly benefit the non-sup-
porting spouse, whereas the supporting spouse and the community
retain little or no assets. It seems more logical to directly reimburse
the supporting spouse, rather than the community. Moreover, it is
the supporting spouse whose interests the section ostensibly aims to
protect.28 It seems even more illogical for the spouse who has origi-
24. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800.3, Cal. L. Revision Comm'n Comment (West Supp. 1985)
(emphasis added).
25. See infra notes 55, 56 and accompanying text.
26. Reimbursement with interest is consistent with the view throughout the sec-
tion that the supporting spouse's interests are similar to a financial investment and can
be recompensed monetarily.
27. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1985).
28. The Law Revision Commission Recommendation states that "[t]he plain ineq-
uity of this situation has generated efforts to provide recompense for the working
spouse .... All factors considered a more equitable solution ... is to require the stu-
dent spouse to reimburse the community." Recommendation Relating to Reimburse-
ment of Educational Expenses, 17 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 229, 233, 235
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nally been the beneficiary to again indirectly benefit when commu-
nity property is divided. This contention is supported by the section's
own standards: under subsection (b) the community is reimbursed
only for contributions which have substantially enhanced the earning
capacity of the party. Because reimbursement does not come into ef-
fect unless one party's lifestyle has been "substantially enhanced"
from the other party's support, the effect is to ensure that the party
with the degree takes twice.29
Subsection (c) mandates that reimbursement be reduced or modi-
fied if "such a disposition [would be] unjust."30 The subsection states
that reimbursement "shall" be reduced given certain circumstances,
thus indicating a reduction is mandatory. Had the section used the
word "may," it might have allowed the court to use its own
discretion.
Although the language mandates reduction of the reimbursement
when necessary, it leaves the door open for the courts to use their
own discretion in determining what type of disposition would be un-
just.3 1 Circumstances which are unjust include, but are not limited
to: (1) circumstances where the community has already received sub-
stantial benefit from the enhanced earning capacity gained by the de-
gree;32 (2) circumstances where the supporting spouse was also
educated or trained; and (3) circumstances where the education and
training received by the non-supporting spouse enables the support-
ing spouse, later in the marriage, to receive education and training.33
Additionally, subsection (c), clause (1) imposes a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the community has not substantially benefited from
contributions if the marriage lasts less than ten years.34 Conversely,
(1984). Other commentators agree that reimbursement should be to the community.
See Mullenix, supra note 2, at 278.
29. In California, community property is divided equally. See CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 4800(a) (West Supp. 1985). This means, in most cases, that the student spouse will
receive fifty percent of the contributions reimbursed to the community.
30. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.3(c) (West Supp. 1985).
31. The Law Revision Commission Comment states, "Subdivision (c) is intended
to permit the court to avoid the requirements of this section in an appropriate case."
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.3, Cal. L. Revision Comm'n Comment (West Supp. 1985).
32. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800.3(c)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
33. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800.3(c)(2) (West Supp. 1985). The language of subsection
(c) is difficult to interpret without referring to the Law Revision Comment. This sub-
section was passed in the same form as the original version proposed by the Law Revi-
sion Commission recommendation and is in need of rewriting.
34. The original version of the section did not contain the rebuttable presumption
mechanism. It did propose under subsection (b) (1) that community contributions be
limited to those made within ten years before commencement of the proceeding. Rec-
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the presumption is that the community has substantially benefited if
the marriage lasts longer than ten years.35 In the case where the
marriage has lasted less than ten years, such as in Sullivan, it is diffi-
cult to understand why a higher standard of proof is necessary. The
intent of subsection (c) is to reduce or modify reimbursement. How-
ever, clause (1) mandates that the finder of fact presume that the
community has not benefited from the party's education. The logical
inference from the presumption is that having given no benefit to the
community, the supporting spouse is left with nothing, resulting in a
manifestly unjust situation. Although subsection (c) purports to re-
duce reimbursement in unjust circumstances, the rebuttable pre-
sumption mechanism functions to override the subsection's
"unjustness" requirement, thereby nullifying it.
Subsection (d) is crucial to the effect of the section. It stipulates
that reimbursement "is the exclusive remedy of the community or a
party for the education or training and any resulting enhancement of
the earning capacity of a party."3 6 Many other jurisdictions have ap-
plied a variety of remedies to the Sullivan type situation.37 In these
jurisdictions, the courts have invoked their powers of equity to fash-
ion an appropriate remedy. Because this section excludes parties
from pursuing other remedies, it expressly limits the court's powers
of equity unless the section is expressly overruled or its operation is
"unjust."38
Subsection (d) also provides that the section shall not be construed
so as to impact any possible support order. This is certainly protec-
tive of the spouse who has not been educated or trained. However,
the logical inference from the section itself is that one spouse has
supported the other spouse while he or she gained a professional de-
gree or training.39 Thus if the spouse could support both parties in
whole or in part, the spouse is most probably not eligible for spousal
ommendation Relating to Reimbursement of Educational Expenses, 17 CAL. L. REVI.
SION COMM'N REPORTS 229, 240 (1984). The commission noted "The 10-year limitation
is admittedly arbitrary, but is designed to achieve simplicity and justice in the ordi-
nary case." Id. at 237 (emphasis added). What an ordinary case would be is not
explained.
35. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.3(c)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
36. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.3(d) (West Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). In reality, the
educational degree itself has no value. It is the increased earning capacity which ac-
companies the degree that is truly valuable. See Mullenix, supra note 2, at 275.
37. See supra notes 2-3.
38. The California Supreme Court has implicitly approved the section in In re
Marriage of Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
39. The supporting spouse may be either male or female. See, e.g., Saint-Pierre v.
Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250 (S.D. 1984) (husband not entitled to reimbursement ali-
mony because he did not forego career plans or advancement for wife's medical prac-
tice). However, it should be noted that generally the supporting spouse is a woman.
See Mullenix, upra note 2, at 299 n.7.
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support, which is partially based on need.4o ' The necessity for this
provision is questionable.
Although the section may be the exclusive remedy for a supporting
spouse, subsection (e) provides an exemption for express written
agreements. The subsection does not state the time at which the
agreement must be made, therefore an agreement might be antenup-
tial, made during the marriage or even made as a property settlement
after the dissolution of the marriage.41
The agreement must be written. This precludes informal oral
agreements between the parties. Generally, marital relations are not
conducted in the same manner as contract agreements. Most married
couples do not formalize their marital aspirations after pursuing
arms length negotiations.42 Most aspirations are expressed orally, if
they are discussed at all. It would be safe to say that, upon entering a
marriage, the parties have a strong belief that the marriage will last
for a long period of time. In many marriages, the supporting spouse
would not view his or her support as an investment or a formalized
contractual agreement. Reciprocity is generally assumed. This sub-
section is exemplary of the basic problem inherent in the theoretical
underpinning of the section as a whole. The problem is that the sec-
tion attempts to remedy the unfulfilled expectations of the marital
relationship. The reality is that the supporting spouse's expectations
of a future marital relationship, including all of its intangible feel-
ings, needs, and goals, can never truly be remedied by a court of
law.43
40. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801. Section 4801(a)(1) was companion legislation to
section 4800.3 and added contributions to a spouse's education or training as a factor to
be considered by the court when making a spousal support award. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 4801(a)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
41. California recognizes many types of marital agreements, including pre- and
post-marital agreements, separation agreements, transmutation agreements, and prop-
erty settlement agreements. See CAL. PRAc. GUIDE: FAiA. L., (TRG) § 9:1 (1985). The
agreement should meet the basic requirements for the agreements stated above. If
consulted to draft an agreement, counsel should expressly state within the agreement
that the accord is meant to supersede section 4800.3.
42. Family law practitioners should note the value of an antenuptial agreement
protecting the supporting spouse's interests as a preventative measure.
43. Many law review commentaries have addressed -this issue: see supra notes 2, 3.
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III. FUTURE APPLICATION OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL
CODE SECTION 4800.3
A. Does the Section Provide a Workable Remedy?
The case of In re Sullivan was remanded for a property settlement
consistent with California Civil Code section 4800.3. The question
whether Janet Sullivan, and others in her position, have been af-
forded an equitable remedy is a subjective one.44 What should be ex-
amined is whether the statute is "workable," i.e., whether the result
of its application in the trial court conforms with the legislature's in-
tent. Unfortunately, legislative intent will provide little guidance to
the courts, as the final version of the section is almost exactly the
same as the initial Law Revision Commission version.45 Although
the courts will have a certain amount of leeway in the application of
the section, their decisions will most definitely be limited to the facts
presented to them. Therefore the parties play a crucial role in the
development of this area through the manner in which they litigate
their claims.
B. Approaches to a Claim under California Civil Code Section
4800.3
The family law practitioner must begin by informing clients of the
existence of a new right to reimbursement. Where the facts elicited
in the initial interview may indicate even a minimal amount of sup-
port of a spouse earning a professional degree or training,46 a practi-
tioner may be liable for malpractice if a claim under section 4800.3 is
not filed.
In many Sullivan type circumstances, the appropriate choice of re-
lief is summary dissolution.47 However, the existence of a reimburse-
ment right complicates the requirements for summary dissolution.
Moreover, parties may pursue summary dissolution without the aid
44. If the courts limit reimbursement to tuition, books and other minor academic
expenses, the supporting spouse gains very little. The true value of the professional
degree is its enhancement of the holder's earning capacity. The supporting spouse has
not been recompensed for her expectancy of a better lifestyle, a higher standard of liv-
ing. Most law review commentaries address this issue. See supra notes 2, 3. But see
Recommendation Relating to Reimbursement of Educational Expenses, 17 CAL. L. RE-
VISION COMM'N REPORTS 229, 234 (1984) ("to give the working spouse an interest in
half the student spouse's increased earnings for the remainder of the student spouse's
life because of the relatively brief period of education and training received during
marriage is not only a windfall to the working spouse but in effect a permanent mort-
gage on the student spouse's future").
45. 17 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS at 229, 240 (1984).
46. See supra note 19.
47. Marriages with little or no assets, no children and which last less than five
years are good candidates for summary dissolution. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4550-4554
(West Supp. 1985).
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of an attorney. However, if the parties do consult with an attorney
for guidance, the attorney must be sure to explain the implications of
the section on the dissolution procedure. 48
To commence the dissolution proceeding, counsel must prepare an
appropriate pleading. The California Judicial Council has created
forms which must be used where mandated by the California Rules
of Court.49 As of the date of this article, no Judicial Council Form
has been prepared to expressly provide for a. stipulation concerning
section 4800.3.50 Therefore, when completiag the petition or re-
sponse, counsel must pay close attention to item 5 of the current Ju-
dicial Council Form.51
Item 5 concerns declarations of community and quasi-community
assets and obligations. Counsel may insert a "catch all" statement to
cover relief granted by section 4800.3.52 However, counsel should
note that a reimbursement right is not a community property inter-
est and may not, therefore, be bound by the doctrine of res judicata.5 3
If reimbursement is not alleged in the initial pleading, it could possi-
bly be alleged at a later date, or in court. Counsel for the respondent
should note that if reimbursement is declared, such a declaration is a
statement of fact which, unless controverted, is taken as true. There-
fore, when drafting the response, counsel should be sure to contro-
48. Counsel should note that under the California Rules of Court summary disso-
lution forms are mandatory. Cal. Rules of Court Rule 1273 (1985). See Cal. Rules of
Court Form 1295.10, 1295.20, 1295.30. Clients should be advised that under form
2195.10(9), which asks for a statement of community assets, reimbursement should be
stated within the parties' settlement agreement. Reimbursement may be precluded if
under item 9 the parties state that there are no commuaity assets or liabilities. Cal.
Rules of Court Form 1295.10(9) (Rev. January 1, 1985).
49. Cal. Rules of Court Forms 1281, 1282 (Rev. January 1, 1983) (Judicial Council
of California Form for petition for dissolution and response).
50. Before filing or serving an official form, counsel should make sure that it is
the most recent version. A comprehensive list of current Judicial Council Forms is
available from the court of the practitioner's jurisdiction.
51. Cal. Rules of Court Forms 1281, 1282 (Rev. January 1, 1983).
52. Petitioner might state the following: "Petitioner is informed and believes that
the community has a right of reimbursement for commurity contributions towards re-
spondent's professional degree (or substitute: training). Petitioner asks leave to amend
this petition or to file an appropriate pleading to allege the exact nature of such contri-
butions when they are ascertained." If the petitioner has records of expenses or a
clear recollection of the contributions that have been made, counsel may itemize the
claims of contribution and attach the itemization to the petition. See Cal. Rules of
Court Form 1285.55 (Property Declaration).
53. However, if a statement is made concerning community property, or if item (a)
of forms 1281 or 1282 is marked stating that there is no community property, the alle-
gations become res judicata.
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vert the basis for reimbursement in general, or to controvert specific
itemizations set out by the petition.
Counsel should also note that the section has an effect on spousal
support. California Civil Code section 4801(a)(1) states that the court
must consider certain factors as a basis for spousal support. One of
the factors is the extent to which the spouse who was initially sup-
ported in turn subsequently supports the spouse to gain professional
training or a degree.54
The two key areas concerning negotiation and litigation of claims
for reimbursement are: (1) how community contributions are deter-
mined; and (2) what constitutes substantial enhancement of earning
capacity. The petitioner should allege the broadest definition of com-
munity contributions possible. This issue should be relatively easy
for a court to determine, as it is based on past actual circumstances. 55
Substantial enhancement is a much more difficult area because it en-
tails an evaluation of a future course of action.56
Counsel should tailor discovery to elicit facts concerning the com-
munity's contributions. Those facts will become important during
trial, especially if the petitioner is asking the court to include living
expenses and other items in its definition of community contribu-
54. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a)(1) (West Supp. 1985). See also supra note 42. A sup-
porting spouse could possibly use section 4801(a)(1) to claim spousal support while pur-
suing his or her own education or training.
55. See supra note 17. Petitioner should allege not only tuition, books, supplies
and laboratory fees, but other support considerations such as living expenses, transpor-
tation costs, health care and entertainment. Accordingly, respondent should allege the
narrowest definition possible, academic fees only.
56. Reimbursement is only granted if community contributions substantially en-
hance the earning capacity of a party. The problems presented by this issue were re-
viewed by the Law Revision Commission:
Despite the virtues of a reimbursement right, there are a number of
problems that must be resolved. The reimbursement right is appropriate in
the typical situation where the student spouse receives education that sub-
stantially enhances his or her earning capacity. But in some cases the educa-
tion may not enhance the student spouse's earning capacity, or may enhance it
only marginally, or may enhance it but the student spouse engages in other
work to which the enhancement is irrelevant. In these cases the equities
change. If there is no enhancement or only a marginal enhancement of the
student spouse's earning capacity, the basis of the reimbursement right-that
the community contributed funds for the economic benefit of the student
spouse-fails. The reimbursement right should apply only where enhance-
ment of the student spouse's earning capacity is substantial. This will ensure
fairness in imposing on the student spouse the economic burden of reimburse-
ment and will avoid litigation over small expenditures such as weekend semi-
nars whose impact on the student spouse's earning capacity is speculative or
intangible. Where enhancement of the student spouse's earning capacity is
substantial but the student spouse does not take advantage of this, reimburse-
ment should nonetheless be required. The higher earning potential is still
available to the student spouse, who may take advantage of it in the future.
The student spouse should not be able to avoid the reimbursement require-
ment simply by working at a lower-paying job until the marriage is dissolved.
17 CAL. L. REV. COMM'N REPORTS at 235-36 (emphasis added).
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tions. Although the petitioner may have provided monetary support
for the other spouse's education, he or she may not know the spouse's
actual expenses.
Thorough discovery should be pursued, during which the petitioner
may propound a Request for Admissions.57 The effect of a Request
for Admissions would be to solidify the parties' positions on what
items shall be included as community contributions. If the respon-
dent admits that certain somewhat questionable items, such as living
expenses, should be included, or if the respondent does not comply
with the request, then the court should take great deference to the
parties' stipulations.
Counsel may want to specifically state contentions concerning re-
imbursement in the At Issue Memorandum and during* the
Mandatory Settlement Conference.58 Many courts and litigators will
be unaware of or unfamiliar with the statute, and it will be advanta-
geous for counsel to take every means possible to present the issues
and the parties' contentions. One way to clearly state the petitioner's
or respondent's contentions concerning the definition of community
contributions is to submit a settlement conference trial brief.59
If the case is not settled out of court and proceeds to trial, peti-
tioner's counsel should attempt to introduce as much evidence as pos-
sible concerning community expenditures. This will aid the court in
its determinations and perfect the record for appeal. Because this
section has not been tested in the trial courts, determinations con-
cerning its "gray areas," community contributions and substantial en-
hancement, are inherently appealable.
If an appeal is contemplated, counsel should request a Statement of
Decision from the court.60 Statements of Decision are especially ap-
propriate when a property interest or obligation is controverted at
trial. Counsel should be aware that "[a]fter a, party has requested
such a statement, any party may make proposals as to the content of
the statement of decision." 61 Therefore, counsel should file a propo-
sal in every case where a property interest is at, issue.
Counsel should also note that, in general, reversals and modifica-
57. See CAL. PRAC. GUIDE: FAM. L., (TRG) § 11:61 (19,85); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 2033 (West 1983) (for procedural information concerning ,requests for admissions).
58. See CAL. PRAC. GUIDE: FAM. L., (TRG) § 13:28-13:32 (1985).
59. Since court rules differ jurisdictionally, counsel should check to determine
whether a trial brief is mandatory.
60. See CAL. PRAC. GUIDE: FAM. L., (TRG) § 15:26-15:47 (1985).
61. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 632 (West Supp. 1985).
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tions of awards made by the trial court are governed by an "abuse of
discretion" standard.62 The appellate courts may also be reluctant to
review whether certain community contributions are covered under
the law, deeming the question one of fact, and therefore not within
its scope of review. Where the amount of reimbursement is small,
the client may wish to accept the trial court's ruling rather than pur-
sue appeal.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court has created more confusion out of an
already confusing section,63 the trial courts should have less trouble
construing the section if litigants provide them with an adequate
legal and factual basis for their decisions. A claim for reimbursement
of community contributions for professional education and training is
unique to California family law, and thus creative litigation is possi-
ble. Counsel should urge the courts to adopt workable standards and
to interpret equitably any poorly worded provisions which might en-
cumber the section's equitable goals.
SUZANNE E. RAND
62. CAL. PRAC. GUIDE: FAM. L., (TRG) § 16:64 (1985).
63. See In re Marriage of Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354
(1984) (court uses the word compensation instead of reimbursement).
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